The claimant submtted that: (i) the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity to make the disputed will; (ii) the testatrix had not known and approved the contents of the disputed will; and (iii) the disputed will had been procured by the defendant’s undue influence.
The court ruled:
(1) It was well established that it was essential to the exercise of the freedom of testamentary disposition that a testator should understand the nature of the act and its effects; should understand the extent of the property of which he was disposing; should be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect. With a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind should poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties - that no insane delusion should influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made. Further, the burden lay with the propounder of the will to establish capacity, where the will was duly executed and appeared rational on its face, the court would presume capacity.
In the instant case, on the detailed findings of fact, the testatrix had testamentary capacity when she had given instructions for her will. On those occasions, she had understood the extent of the property which she had been disposing. Further, she was able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which she had felt she ought to give effect. She had had a very clear and considered view as to whether she should benefit her granddaughter, and she had been clear and settled in her mind that she had not wanted to do that. Furthermore, the testatrix had not been suffering from any disorder of the mind when she had made the will.
Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, none of the terms of the will were so surprising that the conclusion that the testatrix had lacked testamentary capacity on the relevant dates should be resisted.
(2) It was settled law that apart from having testamentary capacity, the testator should know and approve the contents of the will. In that respect, the courts had adopted a two-stage approach to the evidence in a case where knowledge and approval were in issue. The first stage was to ask whether the circumstances were such as to ‘excite suspicion’ on the part of the court. If so, the burden was on the propounder of the will to establish that the testator had known and had approved the contents of the will.
In the circumstances, the testatrix had known and approved the terms of the disputed will. The detailed findings of fact clearly led to the conclusion that she had known what she had been doing and had known the effect of her actions. Accordingly, it was not necessary, or appropriate to ask whether the terms of the will would excite suspicion. Based on all the evidence, a clear conclusion could be reached so that the instant case did not turn upon questions as to the burden of proof.
(3) It was well established that in a case of testamentary disposition of assets there was no presumption of undue influence. Whether undue influence had procured the execution of a will was therefore a question of fact. The burden of proving it lay on the person who asserted it. In that context, undue influence meant influence exercised either by coercion, in the sense that the testator’s will had to be overborne, or by fraud.
In respect of the allegations of undue influence, there was no such arguable case. There was no evidence that the defendant had ever tried to persuade or otherwise influence the testatrix to make a will in his favour. She had wanted to make a will so that the claimant would not inherit her estate on intestacy. Having decided that much, she then had to consider who would benefit. She had freely chosen the defendant. Her choice had been influenced by her belief, at any rate her hope, that if she had made a will in favour of the defendant and told him that she had done so, that would help her because he would be more likely to visit and care for her.
The disputed will had been a valid and effective will and had rightly been admitted to probate.