Dismissal - based on Employers decision of Tribunals?

November 23rd, 2011

In London Central Bus Company Ltd v Nana-Addai [2011] it was decided that in determining a wrongful dismissal claim, the tribunal must decide what, as a matter of fact, actually happened and whether what the employee actually did was so fundamental a breach as to justify instant dismissal. In contrast to the test in unfair dismissal cases, the employer’s “reasonable belief” of what happened is irrelevant. In this case, a bus driver had been summarily dismissed for negligence in failing to check the wheels of a bus, one of which subsequently came off whilst the bus was carrying passengers. The tribunal rejected his unfair dismissal complaint but held he had been wrongfully dismissed. The EAT upheld cross-appeals and remitted the case back to the tribunal because the tribunal had confused the two different tests and failed to make all of the necessary findings of fact.

This case shows that clearly there is a different test which applies in wrongful and unfair dismissal cases. An employer who has a reasonable belief that an act is sufficiently serious to justify gross misconduct for the purposes of unfair dismissal might still be liable for wrongful dismissal as that test is not subjective.

 

Holiday Leave whilst sick

November 23rd, 2011

Fraser v Southwest London St George’s Mental Health Trust [2011] UKEAT

The EAT has held that an employee on long-term sick leave must request annual leave in accordance with the Working Time Regulations to be entitled to payment for it. The case in inconsistent with previous EAT authorities. A nurse injured was on long-term sick leave for 3 years. Upon termination of her employment, the employer paid her in lieu of untaken leave accrued in the final leave year, but nothing in respect of the two previous leave years. The nurse brought a tribunal claim seeking payment in respect of leave for each of those 2 years. It was accepted that she had accrued leave in those years but the tribunal found that she had to trigger the entitlement to be paid for it by giving notice, which she had not done. The EAT upheld this decision and was satisfied that this approach was consistent with current ECJ case law. The employer was not under any contractual duty to inform the employee of her right to request leave while absent on sick leave.

This is decision is also inconsistent with the EAT decision in NHS Leeds v Larner in which the employees untaken holiday leave was carried over to the next yera regardless of a request being made. This decision however was based on European cases and the WTD which is not directly effective in UK law.

 

Is the will valid?

September 19th, 2011

 

We have seen a rise in the number of cases where one seeks to set aside a Will. These cases can be tricky but fortunately there is an abundance of case law to assist us. In 2009, we acted for the children of an estate and we were successful is having a Will, which was prepared by professional will writers and which gave the entire £2m of the estate to one son to the exclusion of others, treated as invalid. However not all cases are successful and it is just as important to know how to defend such cases as well as prosecute them.
Cowderoy v Cranfield [2011] EWHC 1616 (Ch)
On 13 November 2006, the testatrix made a will (the disputed will), appointing the defendant as her sole executor and leaving him her entire estate. The defendant had been a former near neighbour of hers. Probate of the disputed will was granted to the defendant on 7 May 2009. The granddaughter of the testatrix (the claimant) brought proceedings against the defendant, seeking revocation of the grant of probate and asking the court to pronounce against the force and validity of the disputed will. If the disputed will was held to be invalid, the result would be that the testatrix would have died intestate. In those circumstances, the claimant sought a grant of letters of administration of the estate of the testatrix. On an intestacy, the claimant would inherit all of the testatrix’s estate.

The claimant submtted that: (i) the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity to make the disputed will; (ii) the testatrix had not known and approved the contents of the disputed will; and (iii) the disputed will had been procured by the defendant’s undue influence.

The court ruled:

(1) It was well established that it was essential to the exercise of the freedom of testamentary disposition that a testator should understand the nature of the act and its effects; should understand the extent of the property of which he was disposing; should be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect. With a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind should poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties - that no insane delusion should influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made. Further, the burden lay with the propounder of the will to establish capacity, where the will was duly executed and appeared rational on its face, the court would presume capacity.

In the instant case, on the detailed findings of fact, the testatrix had testamentary capacity when she had given instructions for her will. On those occasions, she had understood the extent of the property which she had been disposing. Further, she was able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which she had felt she ought to give effect. She had had a very clear and considered view as to whether she should benefit her granddaughter, and she had been clear and settled in her mind that she had not wanted to do that. Furthermore, the testatrix had not been suffering from any disorder of the mind when she had made the will.

Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, none of the terms of the will were so surprising that the conclusion that the testatrix had lacked testamentary capacity on the relevant dates should be resisted.

(2) It was settled law that apart from having testamentary capacity, the testator should know and approve the contents of the will. In that respect, the courts had adopted a two-stage approach to the evidence in a case where knowledge and approval were in issue. The first stage was to ask whether the circumstances were such as to ‘excite suspicion’ on the part of the court. If so, the burden was on the propounder of the will to establish that the testator had known and had approved the contents of the will.

In the circumstances, the testatrix had known and approved the terms of the disputed will. The detailed findings of fact clearly led to the conclusion that she had known what she had been doing and had known the effect of her actions. Accordingly, it was not necessary, or appropriate to ask whether the terms of the will would excite suspicion. Based on all the evidence, a clear conclusion could be reached so that the instant case did not turn upon questions as to the burden of proof.

(3) It was well established that in a case of testamentary disposition of assets there was no presumption of undue influence. Whether undue influence had procured the execution of a will was therefore a question of fact. The burden of proving it lay on the person who asserted it. In that context, undue influence meant influence exercised either by coercion, in the sense that the testator’s will had to be overborne, or by fraud.

In respect of the allegations of undue influence, there was no such arguable case. There was no evidence that the defendant had ever tried to persuade or otherwise influence the testatrix to make a will in his favour. She had wanted to make a will so that the claimant would not inherit her estate on intestacy. Having decided that much, she then had to consider who would benefit. She had freely chosen the defendant. Her choice had been influenced by her belief, at any rate her hope, that if she had made a will in favour of the defendant and told him that she had done so, that would help her because he would be more likely to visit and care for her.

The disputed will had been a valid and effective will and had rightly been admitted to probate.

New Family Rules

September 19th, 2011

The implementation of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) on the 6 April 2011 is the largest wholesale reform of family procedure for 20 years. They apply in the family proceedings court, county court and High Court and introduce an overriding objective, case management provisions, a streamlining of procedure and contain new ADR (mediation) provisions.

The aim of the overriding objective is to enable the court to deal with cases justly, having regard to any welfare issues involved. Key factors are proportionality, ensuring the parties are on an equal footing and the active management of cases. The FPR 2010 introduce, by way of a Practice Direction, a pre-application protocol (the Protocol) for mediation information and assessment. The Protocol provides for all potential applicants for a court order in relevant family proceedings, before making their application, to have followed the steps set out in the Protocol. This requires a potential applicant, except in certain specified circumstances, to consider with a mediator whether the dispute may be capable of being resolved through mediation.

For a full review of the new rule please conduct us.

To Mediate or not to Mediate?

September 19th, 2011

Research shows that mediation, if used properly, can save substantial costs, time and stress to all parties. Daniel Gearing is an accredited mediator and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of mediation.
Mediation is a flexible process which is highly confidential (if the parties want it to be). A neutral mediator who is paid for by both parties, whilst not giving legal advice, will actively assist you working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute. You remain in ultimate control of the decision to settle and the terms of resolution.  The advantages of mediation over litigation/arbitration are usually lower costs, much quicker process, flexibility, confidentiality and the fact it is a voluntary process in which you have a high level of involvement.

The disadvantages are the inability to insist on a settlement and thus secure a remedy without agreement and sometimes there can be a lack of legal enforceability of terms (depending on how the settlement is documented). Also the early disclosure of strengths and weaknesses (which may sometimes actually be an advantage) can perhaps be considered a disadvantage.

Perhaps the main advantage is that if the mediation results in a settlement, apart from the fact the costs involved are much less than a litigated dispute, the settlement can include almost anything you want whereas the court have limited powers. So in matrimonial matters you can deal with all aspects of finances and children and include provisions which, for example, require one party to pay a credit card bill (which the courts cannot order). In employment matters, you can negotiate a reference, considers alternative roles and perhaps even negotiate a new contract.

There is an EU Directive on mediation. The aim of the directive is to facilitate access to alternative dispute resolution and promote the amicable settlement of disputes by encouraging the use of mediation and ensuring a balanced relationship between mediation and judicial proceedings. England and Wales have made progress in their action to implement the Directive with the introduction of a new Section III in CPR 78 (CPR 78.23-78.28) which deals with the enforceability of mediation settlement agreements and protecting the use of mediation evidence.  The new rules in England and Wales took effect from 6 April 2011.

Employment Law changes from 1st October 2011

September 19th, 2011

On 1 October 2011 the following new laws will apply: (a) the Agency Workers Regulations 2010, which implement the Agency Workers Directive, giving agency workers a right to equal treatment with their directly recruited counterparts after 12 weeks in the job; (b) amendments to national minimum wage rates; and (c) although the Regulations phasing out the default retirement age of 65 have already taken effect since 6 April 2011 via transitional provisions, those transitional provisions apply only to the retirement of persons who have reached the age of 65 by 1 October 2011.

Agency workers -

from the first day of an assignment, agency workers will have the right to be treated no less favourably than a comparable worker in relation to: (a) access to collective facilities and amenities provided by the hirer to direct hires, for example a staff canteen, childcare facilities; (b) information on relevant permanent vacancies within the hirer; and (c) after a qualifying period of 12 weeks, the right to equal treatment in comparison with permanent workers as regards basic working conditions to include pay, duration of working time, night work, rest breaks and annual leave.

National minimum wage rates -
Removal of default retirement age - up until 5 April 2011 dismissing a worker at or over the age of 65 (the ‘default retirement age’) would not contravene the Equality Act 2010 (or the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006) if the reason for the dismissal was retirement. 
In order to take advantage of these provisions, and avoid a claim for age discrimination and/or unfair dismissal when retiring an employee who had reached the age of 65, an employer had to comply with various procedures, the first of which was to issue a notice of retirement to the relevant employee.

increase the rate paid to workers aged below 18 who have ceased to be of compulsory school age from £3.64 to £3.68 per hour.

From 6 April 2011, the position fundamentally changed: employers are no longer entitled to issue notices of retirement to employees, and so are no longer able to take advantage of the automatic protection against age discrimination and/or unfair dismissal claims when retiring an employee who has reached the age of 65. Going forward, employers will have to show some other potentialy fair reason for dismissal other than retirement in order to avoid a successful claim for unfair dismissal (for employees with unfair dismissal rights), ie capability, conduct, redundancy or some other substantial reason.  Employees will also have to show justification of any dismissal for age-related reasons, in order to avoid a successful claim of age discrimination. Please contact us for further advice on this subject and be sure to review your employment contracts.

Pre-nuptial agreements

April 21st, 2011

A pre-nuptial (or pre-registration) agreement is a contract between the parties to an intended marriage or civil partnership that seeks to regulate their affairs in the event that their relationship ends. For the majority, financial arrangements will be the main focus of such agreements.

Pre-nuptial agreements are not formally binding in England and Wales. They have been regarded by the court as persuasive and even “decisive” and a pre-nuptial agreement may influence the outcome of an application for ancillary relief (a financial remedy), either as part of all the circumstances of the case that the court has a duty to consider, or as conduct it would be inequitable to disregard. Following the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino that advice may need to be tempered by the weight given to the pre-nuptial in that case.

 

In Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino a pre-nuptial agreement drawn up in Germany, had been entered into by a French husband and a German wife of substantial means. The parties were married in London and were living in England at the time of separation. In both Germany and France such agreements are enforceable. Under the terms of the agreement no financial provision would be made for either spouse in the event of a divorce. The wife’s appeal against the lower court’s decision to award the husband approximately £5.8 million despite the existence of the pre-nuptial agreement was successful in the Court of Appeal and upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that insufficient weight had been given to the existence of the pre-nuptial agreement in the initial award. Lord Justice Thorpe in his leading judgment, said that he believed that it had become ‘increasingly unrealistic’ for the courts to disregard pre-nuptial agreements.In the Supreme Court judgment in Radmacher the court set out guidelines (specifically applied to the facts in Radmacher) as to what weight should be given to a pre-nuptial agreement as follows:

 

  • Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement which should detract from the weight which should be accorded to it? Parties must enter into a pre-nuptial agreement voluntarily, without undue pressure and be informed of its implications. The question is whether there is any material lack of disclosure, information or advice.
  • Did the foreign elements of the case enhance the weight that should be accorded to the agreement? In 1998, when this agreement was signed, the fact that it was binding under German law was relevant to the question of whether the parties intended the agreement to be effective, at a time when it would not have been recognised in the English courts. After this judgment it will be natural to infer that parties entering into agreements governed by English law will intend that effect be given to them.
  • Did the circumstances prevailing at the time the court made its order make it fair or just to depart from the agreement? A pre-nuptial agreement may make provisions that conflict with what a court would otherwise consider to be fair. The principle, however, to be applied is that a court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless, in the circumstances prevailing, it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement. A nuptial agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the reasonable requirements of any children of the family, but respect should be given to individual autonomy and to the reasonable desire to make provision for existing property. In the right case an pre-nuptial agreement can have decisive or compelling weight.

Partnership Agreements: Court Considers Arbitration Clauses

April 21st, 2011

The High Court has indicated that arbitration clauses in partnership or LLP agreements are unenforceable if they are being used to limit the person’s right to pursue a discrimination claim.

Faced with employment tribunal proceedings for sex discrimination and whistleblowing, a law firm came up with the “novel” argument that they should be granted a mandatory injunction requiring their former partner to consent to, or apply for, a stay of her employment tribunal proceedings so her dispute could be decided by arbitration under the partnership agreement. 

However, the High Court rejected the application for an injunction, holding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it sought to preclude or limit the continuation of the claims, contrary to the Equality Act 2010  and the Employment Rights Act 1996. The case is being appealed.

Under the Employment Rights Act 1996, a clause that seeks to restrict such rights is unenforceable and one can only compromise certain employment rights by a compromise agreement or through Acas. Partners are generally considered self-employed and so do not have the same rights as employees. However they do have discrimination rights. One of the main purposes of ADR clauses, is to keep matters private. As a result of this case, partnerships must have an eye to employment related issues when dealing with partners.

It is doubtful if a compulsory arbitration clause can ever be imposed where there are discrimination issues as arbitration is a final resolution of a dispute and it is difficult to see how this can be relied upon when it would so clearly limit an individual partner’s right to bring such a claim before an employment tribunal.

Agency Workers Regulations

April 21st, 2011

Draft guidance on the Agency Workers Regulations 2010, which will give temporary agency workers the right to equal treatment in comparison with permanent workers with respect to basic working conditions after a qualifying period of 12 weeks are due to take effect on 1 October 2011.

 

Many important employment rights are only given to employees. For example, only employees can claim unfair dismissal, maternity leave and redundancy rights. Not all people who work for others are considered to be employees. Some work for others but remain independent contractors. Sometimes, as with agency workers, a worker may have two potential employers and it is not clear whether he is employed by either one (or both) of them.

Agency workers are currently entitled to some of the same rights as permanent employees such as health and safety protection, national minimum wage, limits on working time, paid holiday and anti-discrimination protection.

The Temporary Agency Workers Directive was passed by the European Parliament on 22 October 2008, and must be implemented in the UK by 5 December 2011. The Directive gives agency workers the right to be treated on equal terms with the employees and workers of the hirer, as regards basic working and employment conditions.

Guidance to assist understanding the Regulations has now been published. They detail the new entitlements agency workers will receive from the first day of an assignment, and which additional entitlements follow the 12-week qualifying period.
If you are an agency or use agency workers you must understand these provisions.

No need to notify employee for PILON to be effective

April 21st, 2011

There is in principle no reason why the parties to a contract cannot include a provision for the contract to be terminable, with immediate effect, on the payment by the employer of a sum in lieu of notice, and, subject to the use of clear words, there is no requirement for the employee to be notified of the exercise of that right by the employer in order for it to be effective.

 

Employers are free to give notice of dismissal at any time, unless they have expressly or impliedly agreed not to in the contract. An employer or employee can lawfully terminate the contract of employment without notice in a number of ways, including by the making of a payment in lieu of notice (’PILON’) in accordance with an express contractual right to do so.

Please contact us if you think you need to review your employment contracts.